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“I cannot believe that this world body, the United Nations, could stand by, calmly
watching what I submit is genocide masquerading under the guise of a civilised dispensation of
justice.” - Oliver Tambo, exiled President of the African National Congress in an October 8, 1963
speech to the United Nations’ Special Political Committee of the General Assembly1

Introduction
For over fifty years, South Africa’s apartheid government held state power. Its
state sanctioned violence represented an anomaly in the post-war liberalism of the second
half of 20th century. The state that aided in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
would be charged with the two of the most notable episodes of racially targeted violence.
Two pivotal events, the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 and the Soweto Uprising in1976,
respectively, altered the course of United States-South African relations. Both the
Sharpeville Massacre and the Soweto Uprising demonstrate the United States and the
United Nations failure to respond effectively to the public outrages of the apartheid
regime. After Sharpeville, US Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy failed
to establish a consistent foreign policy in opposition to the apartheid regime that was not
influenced by Cold War politics. The Eisenhower administration actually deepened
military ties. Even in the UN, the US stifled attempts by the African-Asian bloc to check
the apartheid state to preserve its Cold War alliance. In the aftermath of the Soweto
Uprising, US Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter would utilize similar political
rhetoric and take no real action towards the apartheid regime. Conversely, by establishing
Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of
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South Africa, the UN took action against the Pretoria regime.2 The US foreign policy
response to the apartheid regime conforms to the Cold War policy of supporting white
capitalism over black liberation. However, the rise of these same black liberation
movements within the US and South Africa eventually forced substantive change. A US
foreign policy focused on Cold War diplomacy and lack of a significant international
pressure by Western States on the apartheid regime encouraged the growth of South
African resistance both in the US and South Africa.
Chapter 1: Literature Review
This chapter introduces central ideas that surround the Sharpeville Massacre and
the Soweto Uprising as well as incorporates the official US and UN position. The works
that informed the background information of this project provide the clearest
historiographical understanding of Sharpeville, Soweto, and US and UN reactions. The
apartheid government of South Africa was a controversial foreign policy consideration
that ten United States Presidents had to address. Each did so differently, and the 1960
Sharpeville Massacre and the 1976 Soweto Uprising marked shifts, either minute and
latent or immediate and overt, in foreign policy towards the Pretoria regime. Cold War
politics, the American Civil Rights Movement, UN pressure, and armed resistance in
South Africa contributed to how apartheid and US governments interacted with one
another. The spatial location of Sharpeville in American politics allowed the Eisenhower
and Kennedy administrations to create superficial reprimands, thereby engendering an
internal South African resistance. Soweto exposed further gaps in US foreign policy
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despite the success of the American Civil Rights Movements and growing international
attention to South Africa’ human rights abuses. The existing literature provides
individualized responses to US-South African relations rather than a cohesive
comparative analysis of the two infamous events.
The common trend of comparing American and South African race experiences
was a critical element of anti-apartheid movements. Nicholas Grant notes the impact of
Little Rock on Eisenhower’s handling of apartheid and the indirect effect it had on the
Pretoria regime’s theoretical defense of apartheid on the international stage.3 Pretoria
watched as the US fumbled the international reaction to Little Rock in 1957 and used it as
a lesson to prepare for the impending day when racial supremacy was not an acceptable
policy. One critical lesson Pretoria learned was the ability to twist the UN’s foundational
principle of self-determination and state sovereignty as a protection from international
scrutiny.4 Grant builds upon Cary Fraser’s earlier arguments that Eisenhower was
sensitive to aligning with South Africa because their race relations made them a liability
in the emerging American Civil Rights Movement.5 Grant then concludes that
Sharpeville’s high publicity on the international stage demonstrated a similar Little Rock
situation that did not sit well with the majority of Americans.6 This analysis of 1950’s
US-South Africa relations informs readers of Eisenhower’s reaction towards the
apartheid government in the aftermath of Sharpeville as the US and South Africa
struggled to handle domestic race relations with international criticism looming.
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Existing literature fails to focus on a comparative analysis of the Sharpeville and
Soweto incidents, yet each provide vital research in case studies and foreign policy
analysis. Many post-apartheid historians’ works argue that the Cold War played a pivotal
role in American policy towards South Africa.7 The domino theory was key in the US
involvement of Southern Africa, especially in regards to Angola and Mozambique
whereby the Soviet Union-backed regimes were seen as enemies of the apartheid state
and as the “capitalist” stronghold in Africa, South Africa presented itself to US as an
ideological ally. Eisenhower, as George White argues, allied with the apartheid
government for aid during the Korean War.8 As an outpost to prevent the spread of
Communism in Africa, white Afrikaners, while isolated, had the mineral resources of
gold and uranium critical to US proxy wars.9 This further adds to the wake of inaction
that follows Eisenhower’s successors. The reaction to Sharpeville also highlights
Eisenhower’s sensitive relationship with apartheid.
White acknowledges the inaction of the Eisenhower administration and the
National Security Council by recalling that meetings pertaining to Sharpeville, often
revolved around how the US will handle African affairs, not the immediate impact of 69
black South African deaths.10 Furthermore, White notes the positive Western-centric
reception of the apartheid government despite the increasing human rights violations by
the regime on African people.11 T. J. Noer further delves into Eisenhower’s problematic
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response to Sharpeville using the example of countering bureaucratic responses from the
State Department and the White House. Noer recalls how State Department Press Officer
Lincoln White’s press release that condemned the violence and offered US support for
the rights of black South Africans to express their grievances that was not cleared by his
superior, the Secretary of State Christian Herter.12 Noer’s explanation of this lack of
consensus within the Eisenhower administration correlates with White’s argument that
the US policy in 1960 was more concerned about the policy implications of Sharpeville
and not the rise of a police state. In that same vein, many post-apartheid historians are
critical of Eisenhower’s response to Sharpeville. Thomas Borstelmann states that
Eisenhower chose strategic military and economic advancements with Pretoria over racial
equality.13 Under Eisenhower, there was never a moral outcry for the end of apartheid
from US foreign policy; rather, apartheid was a necessary evil to aid the fight against
Communism.
For Noer, Cold War politics was the central cause of US-South Africa
complications and the Kennedy presidency epitomized this push and pull. Noer argues
that while Kennedy was progressive compared to predecessors, in terms of racial
representation in the makeup of his administration and decries of human rights abuses,
there was still serious inaction towards apartheid.14 Coupled with the tension within his
own administration on what to actually do with Pretoria, Kennedy’s tenure was
comprised of unfulfilled, half-hearted promises to inefficient policies. Noer recalls
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Kennedy’s shifty attitude towards to Pretoria in having to deal with domestic pushback
for sanctions and international pressure to align with UN-back sanctions and
embargoes.15 Zoe Hyman adds to Noer’s criticism of Kennedy’s inaction towards South
Africa demonstrates a sign of silent compliance with apartheid as opposed to supporting
the presumed communist terrorist anti-apartheid groups that will be later discussed.16
Kennedy clearly struggled in creating a domestic consensus to South African relations
and the attempts to make significant foreign policy change were not fulfilled.
The literature existing on the Sharpeville massacre is fairly consistent in relaying
the specifics of the event and in explaining the rise of armed anti-apartheid resistance.
Tom Lodge’s book on Sharpeville has a complete account of the origins, details, and
implications of Sharpeville. Sharpeville’s effect on the apartheid regime has often been
casted as the turning point where resistance group like the African National Congress
(ANC) and Pan-African Congress (PAC) were banned and went underground.17
Interestingly, Vineet Thakur states that the massacre was an excuse to ban these groups
but does not expound on this claim.18 Following this logic, there should be more literature
pertaining the deliberate action by the South African Defense Unit on the people in
Sharpeville.
Where Thakur falls short in explaining his accusatory claim, Lodge notes the
deliberate cover up by police immediately following the shootings wherein reports of
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witnesses included claims of weapons being placed in the hands of the fallen.19 So why is
the horrific event of March 21, 1960 considered as one of the major turning points of
apartheid history, when it could be classified as a white supremacist victory? The answer
lies in the underground workings of apartheid resistance that did not have the official
support of the United States in 1960, only superficial speeches and promises. Thomas
Borstelmann further criticized Eisenhower as a sympathizer for the white South Africans
while hoping for racial progress in Atlanta, in reference to his claimed American Civil
Rights support.20 This analogy best describes US foreign policy in the wake of
Sharpeville. As the US was grappling with its own race problems in 1960’s, Eisenhower
and his predecessors justified the weak response to Sharpeville by qualifying the black
protestors as Communist agitators that could not be helped until Eisenhower fixed its
domestic problems.
There exists an intrinsic relationship between South African anti-apartheid
resistance and the American Civil Rights Movement, and it is therefore impossible to
discuss America’s role in apartheid politics without acknowledging the domestic
leadership. A key push by various African-American Civil Rights leaders was for
economic sanctions and boycotts of South African made goods that were revitalized after
the Sharpeville Massacre, though many had different theories on how to achieve this
goal.21 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X’s efforts each are a testament to the
African-American anti-apartheid movement in America to the dichotomy of ideas on how
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to force change in US apartheid policy, which paradoxically often merged together. King
drew inspiration from the ANC President Albert Lutuli and consistently cited his peaceful
efforts in speeches across the globe as an early relationship that was likely developed
when Lutuli came to visit King’s father church in Atlanta, Georgia.22 Nesbitt’s analysis
of King’s relationship with anti-apartheid resistance is further complicated by the rise of
armed struggle in the wake of Sharpeville; yet he continued to claim the struggle for race
equality was equal in importance to both African-Americans and black South Africans.23
Malcolm X was no doubt influential in the black nationalist branches of US antiapartheid movements. In several instances, Malcolm X called upon the West to recognize
their power in dismantling apartheid through economic sanctions, one notably being at an
Organization of African Unity Head of State summit in 1964, a position also shared by
King.24 This was a move of solidarity as he was surrounded by African heads of state in a
forum that focused on improving Africa’s place on the world stage. Malcolm X serves as
a counter to the inaction of US officials. While not the focus of this paper, literature
detailing the efforts by US anti-apartheid leaders are worth noting because of the context
they serve as pressuring US leaders.
The underground and rise of armed resistance through the form of Spear of the
Nation, an ANC branch, in the 1960’s was critical to the eventual fall of apartheid and is
a testament to the black South African resolve against the white supremacists. In the eyes
of some historians, the immediate political exile period and the formation of Umkhonto
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weSizwe, Spear of the Nation, is where the substantive anti-apartheid organized resistance
began amongst black South Africans. For Janet Cherry, Umkhonto weSizwe represented a
popular resistance front that many black South Africans endorsed as a viable opponent to
the oppressive regime.25 The sabotage campaign headed by Umkhonto weSizwe, however,
created strife within the apartheid resistance despite the conventional narrative of unity in
their efforts. Paul Landau furthers this claim that Umkhonto weSizwe caused conflicts
within anti-apartheid leadership by relying on previous historians’ work. Most influential
from Landau’s work is a commentary on conflict between then ANC-President Albert
Lutuli, MK leader Nelson Mandela, and the Communist South Africans in terms of how
armed struggle would proceed. Both Cherry and Landau note that the traditionally
pacifists ANC members, like Lutuli, were actually supportive of armed resistance after
Sharpeville.26 Further analysis of Umkhonto weSizwe will further explain the hesitance of
US involvement in supporting the anti-apartheid movement in the Sharpeville chapter
that follows.
Similar to the US reaction to Sharpeville, the United Nations would fall short on
taking a stand against apartheid despite the best efforts of the African bloc in the General
Assembly. This ineffective diplomacy lies primarily in the US and United Kingdom’s
power within the Security Council in carefully navigating the negotiations of sanctions
and embargoes. Simon Steven’s recent work regarding South Africa provides an analysis
of the relationship of key anti-apartheid leaders and the UN in the crafting of economic
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sanctions and arms embargoes resolutions.27 As Sharpeville gained international
attention, the ANC saw an opportunity to decry the need for global economic sanctions
spearheaded by the UN yet faced the critical obstacle of universal adherence.28 Stevens
argues that the increased African representation in the UN created optimism for antiapartheid sanction advocates as the UN was becoming “an anti-colonial majority.”29 The
African bloc within the General Assembly became a significant UN coalition; however,
the overwhelming veto power of the United Kingdom and US hindered any multilateral
economic policies regarding South Africa.
Another important analysis of the UN and US role in South Africa is Ryan Irwin’s
latest book, analyzing 20th century apartheid politics and its legitimacy during the rise of
international liberalism through in the UN.30 Irwin follows Stevens’ similar assertion that
the attempts to apply pressure on the Western states post-Sharpeville was only marginally
influenced by anti-apartheid resistance groups.31 The groups focused efforts on fostering
domestic US supporters and pressured the creation of UN special political committees.32
Irwin’s claims are compared to independent findings in the sections that focus on
Kennedy’s foreign policy, the Nixon-Kissinger policy that would shape Ford’s attitude to
Pretoria, and, most importantly, the evolution of the UN action against South Africa in
the 1960s and 1970s.

Simon Steven, “Boycotts and Sanctions against South Africa: An International History, 1946-1970,”
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The role of anti-apartheid leaders within the ANC in prompting UN action
worked well in keeping South Africa on the UN agenda. Stevens centralizes his argument
through the ANC figures such as Albert Lutuli and the tension over the rise of violent
resistance as a means to maintain UN attention.33 As Lutuli continued to preach economic
sanctions as a means to a peaceful transition from apartheid, Stevens makes the
significant claim that Lutuli was not a proponent of the establishment of MK.34 This is a
typical analysis of Lutuli’s relationship with MK’s creation as a Christian man who
frequently opposed violence; it was other ANC figures, primarily Nelson Mandela, that
took the charge in creating a violence resistance group within the ANC. This claim was
recently refuted in the works of scholars who focus on Lutuli.35 Nonetheless, the later
operational planning of MK was, according to Stevens, prompted by the successful
Resolution 1761 passage, led by the African bloc, that called for serious boycotts of
South African goods and the end of trade with the apartheid state.36 Later resolutions
would dilute this harsh rhetoric with non-mandatory arms embargoes and inspecting
bodies that the US and UK would support within the Security Council as a way to delay
substantive multilateral sanction resolutions.37 As the Sharpeville Massacre gained
worldwide attention, the international organization entrusted in maintaining international
peace would stand by its founding principle of state sovereignty despite the international
and domestic cries for reproach.
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The late 1960’s and early 1970’s was known as the high apartheid years wherein
increased militancy of the government, expansion of Bantustans, and diminished local
Black control of political affairs became the norm.38 In this interlude period came the
infamous Rivonia Trial where Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, another ranking ANC
member, were imprisoned and apartheid occupied South West Africa, modern day
Namibia. Though both are not the focus of this project, each inform what the apartheid
government was rapidly evolving to: a totalitarian state with sights set on exerting control
throughout the region.
Yet another turning point in apartheid history was the Soweto Uprising in June
1976. This marks a significant shift in US foreign policy, particularly on the part of
President Carter; but as Soweto occurred during President Ford’s tenure, the tradition of
insignificant response to egregious human rights violations continued. Current existing
literature, like works on Eisenhower and Kennedy, criticizes the lack of effort to create
serious policies in sanctioning Pretoria. Borstelmann claims that the lack of policy was
due, in part, to Ford’s attention to the independence wars in Angola and Rhodesia, similar
to Eisenhower’s Congo preoccupation.39 In the months leading to the Soweto Uprising,
Noer asserts the critical role of Henry Kissinger in shaping Ford’s communicative
relationship with Pretoria Prime Minister Vorster in the Rhodesia transition, something
that was in the works since Nixon’s term.40 This relationship would obviously hinder
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serious penalties by the Ford administration in the aftermath of Soweto onto the apartheid
regime.
President Carter, however, brought a reinvigorated vision to US foreign policy
towards South Africa. Some historians revere Carter for bringing the humanitarian crisis
of apartheid to the US front pages, yet still criticize him for not doing enough in the form
of sanctions. Alex Thomson notes Carter’s administration vocally criticized Pretoria yet
was weak at making serious sanctions against the apartheid government.41 Thomson
does, however, note Carter’s one clear effort to curb the apartheid government that
extended the United State Import-Export Bank facilities upkeep for 42 months.42 Carter
represented a barely noticeable but still important catalyst in the course of US foreign
policy towards apartheid. Carter’s efforts and struggles to create policy towards the
apartheid regime is analyzed further within the Soweto Uprising chapter.
Moving beyond the Sharpeville Massacre, the South African authorities tightened
security around the state and the political tensions within the country mounted. As the
Black Consciousness Movement began, political parties exiled abroad, and the systematic
imprisonment of anti-apartheid resistance leaders and supporters in cases such as the
infamous Rivonia trials. Many credit the wave of underground workings to the continued
resistance to apartheid.43 The works of these scholars, however, neglect critical
background information of previous demonstrations by youths in other areas against the
apartheid regime. Julian Brown’s recent work illuminates this traceable history of youth
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grassroots resistance, without the aid of older, established political mechanisms to carry
their message.44 These differing claims of the roots of the Soweto Uprising is what makes
placing it difficult, as youths without obvious outward support of older, more established
resistance parties demonstrated against the forced education mandates of Afrikaans as the
medium of instruction.
Rather than the Soweto Uprising being just an explosive expression of pent up
anger, Brown argues that the beginnings of youth resistance started in the universities and
carried through to the primary schools as dialogue was exchanged between school
children that followed the ideology of Black Consciousness.45 Brown goes further to
assert that the Soweto Uprising and the violence that continued in the weeks after June 16
was completely different from previous demonstrations because it was impossible to
avoid the apartheid state role in the deliberate execution of black children. This claim,
however, ignores the growing role of international anti-apartheid groups that developed
after the Sharpeville Massacre played in ensuring apartheid remained a key conversation
in the US and the UN agendas. The final chapter of this project analyzes the international
and United States community reactions to the Soweto Uprising. The Soweto Uprising is
significant in the same vein of Sharpeville: both are horrific events that caught
international tension to exposing the world’s compliance with apartheid while forcing
internal reflection of anti-apartheid tactics from fringe groups that influenced the ANC
cause.
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The works cited throughout this chapter were critical to establish a consensus of
where the historiography is currently at in understanding the Sharpeville Massacre and
the Soweto Uprising. Further chapters will continue to build on these works and reference
them in greater detail. Often the primary documents cited within these chapters were
utilized by these authors. A different interpretation is provided with the special interest in
creating a comparative analysis where the Sharpeville and Soweto victims and actors are
central to the conversation even when not necessarily the focus of political leaders. One
thing is clear from the review of these works: the role of the US and the UN in apartheid
politics that surrounded these atrocities is complex and the real victims were lost amongst
the diplomatic negotiations. It was the pressure groups that ensured the question of
apartheid remained on the international agenda.
To fully understand the complexities of these events and their effects, key actions
by US foreign policy advisors, UN envoys, South African apartheid politicians, and
resistance figures are analyzed within this paper. This project relies primarily on the
works of past historians and political theorists which often conflict with one another in
the motivations of the US, South Africa, and UN regarding apartheid and such disparities
are analyzed in a literature review. The following chapters highlights recently
declassified material, archival databases of apartheid resistance, and US and UN archives
which contribute to the discussion of apartheid foreign policy relations during two coined
turning points.
Chapter 2: A Day in March
In efforts to understand the impact of the Sharpeville Massacre on US foreign
policy, it is important to clearly grasp the fundamental details of the tragedy that would

shape the apartheid regime narrative and, by proxy, US foreign policy. As part of a PanAfrican Congress (PAC) effort to resist the inherently discriminatory pass book laws,
PAC leader Robert Sobukwe led a hastily composed nationwide campaign by gathering
local PAC branches, where they went to the nearby police stations in their area without
their pass books and deliberately got arrested.46 The Sharpeville PAC branch was not
alone in the protest against pass books, yet what made the protest in Sharpeville unique
was the mass participation and the state polices’ violent reaction.
On March 21, 1960, protesters gathered around the Sharpeville police precinct at
approximately around 8 AM.47 The PAC Task Force deliberately pressured the shutdown
of transportation leaving Sharpeville so workers could not go to work that Monday
morning by harassing bus drivers.48 The logic of this move was to further demonstrate to
the apartheid government that if black Africans could not work because they were
arrested, then the entire state was at a virtual standstill in terms of economic production.49
This lofty idea was partially achieved by cutting off transportation lines, thereby forcing
workers to participate in the protest. The leaders of the Sharpeville PAC branch were two
brothers, Nyakane and Job Tsolo, and each played an evident part in the organization of
the protest.50 The Tsolo brothers encouraged Sobukwe to come to Sharpeville to
participate in their protest in efforts to bolster more support for the local black
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population. Sobukwe would avoid the forthcoming tragedy by participating in the
Orlando protest and getting arrested there.51 The absence of notable leaders like
Sobukwe, however, did not hinder the protest by the Sharpeville branch.
In the official South African government Commission on the Sharpeville
shootings, there were a claimed 20,000 participants.52 Bishop Ambrose Reeves, who was
not in Sharpeville but would soon visit the township after, interviewed locals and looked
at photographs taken throughout the day. Following this, he claimed it was more likely
that 5,000 people participated in the protests surrounding the police station.53 The
discrepancy over the numbers is critical when understanding the alibi that police would
immediately construct after they fired live ammunition. It is easier to claim defense when
the police are outnumbered. Much of the official account, published in late April by P. J.
Wessels, provides various accounts and eyewitness testimony that discredit the PAC’s
nonviolent appeals and depicts the apartheid police as restrained and acting in selfdefense.54 The atmosphere of the crowd is also not agreed upon. In an address to the
House of Assembly, Verwoerd claims the crowd had quickly began to riot.55 Yet again,
there are countering reports from eyewitnesses and photographs that document a joyous
environment where people gathered in song, laughter, and smiles in front of the police
station.56 There were later reports by a journalist, Humphrey Tyler, who saw the crowd as

51

Lodge, 89
Reeves, 37.
53
Ibid.
54
P.J. Wessels, Report on the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the
Districts of Vereeniging (Namely, at Sharpeville Location and Evaton), and Vanderbijlpark, Province of
the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960, April 13, 1960, University of South Africa Institutional Repository.
55
Reeves, 38
56
Wessels, 91.
52

“amiable,” of women crying out, “Izwelethu,” our land, in Xhosa.57 The difference
between crowd estimates and attitudes not only demonstrate a lack of consensus within
the documents but a conflict over the Sharpeville narrative.
To add to the disparities between the protestors and police, the Sharpeville police
leaders failed to agree on negotiating with the Tsolo brothers. This was, in part, due to the
leader of the incoming reinforcements, Lieutenant Colonel Pienaar, and his refusal to
meet with the outside crowd and discuss the situation with anyone.58 Reeves, looking
back on this lack of communication, makes the claim that this critical connection could
have made a difference in police-protestor relations as the day continued.59 Further
discrepancies within the apartheid police force in communicating is analyzed in in a later
subchapter on how the apartheid government handled the Sharpeville community postMarch 21.
Over the span of eight hours on March 21, the protesters who gathered in front of
the precinct voiced their anger at the racial prejudice they experienced, demanded arrest
for lacking the derogatory pass books, and many were then deliberately executed or
injured by the state. This type of state behavior was not surprising under apartheid rule,
but the scale and publicity of the violence in a single instance is what surprised many. In
the aftermath of Sharpeville came the consolidation of the African National Congress
(ANC) in their messaging & tactics of resistance, all brought forth by pressure from the
PAC, and the awakening of the international masses to question the legitimacy of
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apartheid rule. Sharpeville was the first step in this new future where Black South
Africans would dramatically shift state policy.
2.1 Learning the Hard Way: The Apartheid Response to Sharpeville
Recovering from the public backlash from the first mass atrocity was a difficult
field to navigate for the South African government. For the apartheid police, the first
strategy regarding Sharpeville was a deliberate cover up of evidence in the hours after the
shootings. In the messaging and framing of the massacre, the apartheid government was
careful to shift blame to the protestors. In one New York Times report, the South African
High Commission’s statement claimed the demonstrators fired the first shots, and the
police were forced to open fire to avoid “even more tragic results.”60 This report was
given to the New York Times five days after the shootings on behalf of the South African
Ministry of External Affairs.61 This statement asserts a very serious accusation that the
protesters were armed and creates a narrative of defensive tactics by the Sharpeville
police. However, later reports by the South African government would complicate the
details of Sharpeville. More malicious intentions were quickly executed in effort hide in
the aftermath of Sharpeville by the police. In one report, Lieutenant Colonel Pienaar was
quoted saying, “If they (black South Africans) do these things they must learn the hard
way.”62 As the same Lieutenant Colonel in charge of bringing in reinforcements,
Pienaar’s statement directly goes against the self-defense narrative and shifts the
intentions of police officers to deliberate harm in efforts to curb the protesters and aligns
more with the evidence of the police cover up.
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P. J. Wessels’ report, completed on June 16, creates Pretoria’s own version of the
truth that would work to discredit the further resistance efforts to change apartheid
policies and garner international support. Wessels discredits witnesses multiple times
throughout the report. Perhaps most notable is the character attacks on Job Tsolo, who
Wessels identities as the leader between him and Nyakane. Noting a PAC meeting, Tsolo
stated, “We are ready to destroy white domination… there is no freedom without
bloodshed,” Wessels asserts that PAC leaders made no attempt to quail the violent
tendencies of its followers.63 This is where Tom Lodge’s later analysis of PAC meetings
and understanding of police infiltration of PAC membership plays a significant role.64 It
is likely that Tsolo was aware of possible police spying on the meetings and rationalized
that if the police knew how serious the PAC was in protesting the passbooks then they
would gain their respect as citizens protesting their government. Therefore, Wessels
claim that all PAC leaders were deliberately publishing campaigns that endorsed violence
against the police is fraudulent because it neglects to see the theorizing by PAC leaders.
Most notable about the aftermath of Sharpeville is the forced exile of all Black
political parties and the shift to underground resistance. The language of the previous
bans played a significant role in further establishing Pretoria as a West-friendly African
state on the international stage. Beginning with the Suppression of Communism Act in
1950, the apartheid government wanted to control any rogue ideas against the state. It
would be future Prime Minister B. J. Vorster who added that this Communism Act
included former members of the Communist party.65 This a critical point in apartheid
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politics because it created the precedent of targeted banning of individuals that Pretoria
finds troublesome and further utilized post-Sharpeville.
After Sharpeville, any organizations deemed communist or rebellious towards the
government was banned in efforts to secure the state. This Unlawful Organizations Act
specifically named the ANC and PAC in their legislation and anyone associated with the
organizations were imprisoned.66 Later legislation continued to connect resistance
organizations to communism. Pretoria passed the 76th amendment to the General Laws
known as the Sabotage Act in 1962 that allowed for the 90-day imprisonment of anyone
suspected to be sabotaging the state.67 Sabotage was broadly defined to allow for targeted
policing of prominent resistance leaders, like Nelson Mandela who was imprisoned based
on this legislation. What is worth noting is that a portion of international community saw
the faulted argument. The London-based, New African, newspaper demonstrated the
futility of going after the ANC and PAC in the name of stopping communism because the
communist party had no interest in ending racial oppression.68 Despite this fact, seen later
in the analysis of the US and international reaction, the belief that resistance forces had
ties to communism justified the continued relationship with the capitalist-defending
apartheid regime.
2.2 The Assassination Attempt on Verwoerd
Only weeks after the events in Sharpeville, South Africa was once again central to
the international stage when Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd nearly died in an
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assassination attempt. The relationship between the assassination attempt and the
aftermath of Sharpeville are intrinsically connected. The assassination attempt provided
an out for the government to ignore the racial violence and focus on restoring the image
of a functioning state with an injured leader.
Reports stated that an increase of police presence in Johannesburg was the first
increase since the “presence crisis nearly three weeks ago.”69 No longer were the events
of Sharpeville mentioned except in allusions or in passing. The days following the
assassination attempt, the New York Times involved a full page spread on the event,
including a report on Verwoerd’s work in constructing apartheid, English Queen
Elizabeth II’s well wishes for recovery, and calls by the apartheid government for a
return to normalcy.70 It was more noteworthy, at least within the US, to discuss the
assassination attempt on a white man than the deliberate and consistent oppression of
blacks in that same country. The Verwoerd 1960 assassination attempt is worth
mentioning because the attempt allowed the state to ignore the racial tragedy of the
Sharpeville Massacre. In the wake of this near Afrikaner tragedy, the South African
government was able to momentarily shift away from the international pressure of
legitimizing apartheid after Sharpeville. Verwoerd was, effectively, a near martyr for the
Nationalist cause.
2.3 The South African Problem: The US Response to Sharpeville
US foreign policy towards South Africa in the 1960’s supports Eisenhower’s
complacent attitude towards the apartheid government. Eisenhower’s relationship is
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founded in the need for a militarily sound, anti-communist relationship with an assumed
stable African state during the tumultuous time of African statehood. The immediate
reaction of the US was partly influenced by Lincoln White’s notable statement of
deploring the action and acknowledging the typical protocol of not commenting on
“internal affairs of governments with which [the US] enjoys normal relations,” but the
mass loss of life forced the US to comment.71 White’s statement was impromptu and not
cleared by Secretary of State Herter. Both Eisenhower and Herter viewed the statement as
a mistake. Herter would call the statement, “a breach of courtesy,” between South Africa
and the US.72 Eisenhower used the unique imagery of fat already in the fire and it was too
late to publicly retract the statement.73 The White Statement highlights the lack of
consensus the Eisenhower White House had on South African relations, and this
shocking massacre exposed such inconsistency.
The worries of Eisenhower and Herter’s regarding White’s statement was met
when Philip Crowe, the US ambassador to South Africa, telegrammed Herter warning
that the Afrikaners felt as though the statement was made at their expense in order to gain
favor with Black South Africans.74 This blowback presented a potentially problematic
foreign relations situation especially when South Africa and the US were in the middle of
negotiating a secret base establishment for a missile and satellite outpost in the region. 75
Only after the US carefully worded their contact with South African officials and
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spearheaded moderate UN resolutions did the Nationalist party feel secure in their
relationship. Yet it is important to note that rebuking South African police neglect in
Sharpeville was never Eisenhower’s priority. For him, it was more important to secure an
anti-communist stronghold in an emerging, fledgling continent. A stable Africa would
also maintain US attention in Southeast Asia as US involvement in Vietnam was
escalating concurrently.
Those within the Eisenhower administration differed on the potential impact of
Sharpeville on domestic and international policy. Crowe claimed that the eventual
radicalization of Blacks after the massacre would create a “dangerous and explosive
situation,” that would counter to US interests in the region.76 Crowe, later in the same
document, posits that continued repression of non-whites coupled with the radicalization
could turn the state into a warzone.77 Those endangered US interests were the natural
resources and capital that Eisenhower was so keen to protect such as uranium and gold.
In the CIA’s July 1960 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), South Africa was predicted
to become an isolationist state.78 These worries were met when South Africa voluntarily
left the British Commonwealth after a 52% white only referendum in October.79 The UN
General Assembly would later in 1974 vote to suspend South Africa’s participation.80 An
isolated and potentially civil war endangered state did not make for a good trading ally on
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the African continent and Crowe represented the few in the Eisenhower White House
who were hesitant towards allying with Pretoria.
Countering the bleak predictions of some Eisenhower advisors, there were some
that show an opportunity to advance US assets in the region. CIA Chief Allen Dulles
claimed at a National Security Council meeting that the massacre and radicalization of
Blacks presented an opportunity to smuggle arms to the “natives of South Africa,” to
undermine the white government.81 This would not have been unprecedented in US Cold
War policy but typically this theory would be implemented in support of capitalist rebel
groups to overthrow communist regimes. As such, no further evidence shows that Dulles’
idea was executed. For the white US public, the Blacks of South Africa were communist
while the Nationalist party was the stronghold of capitalism on the dark continent.
Dulles’ thinking proves significant as a part of the US government that was in favor of at
least a weaker white rule in South Africa, not perhaps full equal rule. Yet again Dulles’
statement highlights a focus to advance US assets by selling to both parties of the racial
war in South Africa, why not benefit from this animosity?
Sharpeville’s impact was not unnoticed by the candidates in the upcoming 1960
election. While on the campaign trail when Sharpeville happened, Kennedy’s advisors
knew how crucial it was to garner support by presenting him as a foreign policy expert.
In a campaign brief to help Kennedy formulate a position on African independence,
Professor Fred Burke called for Kennedy to remain focused on Africa stating, “the future
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of America is bound up with the future of Africa.”82 Kennedy released a public statement
that strongly criticized the South African government for their continued oppression of
the black majority.83 This type of language, of course, was rolled back once Kennedy
entered the White House.
Upon entering the White House, Kennedy was concerned with the rhetoric of
peace rather than the practice of it. In preparing for Kennedy’s address to the UN 18th
General Assembly, Kennedy focused on the context of how to include human rights in
the speech.84 Kennedy chose to end the meeting shortly after this statement. This short
transcript encompasses Kennedy’s rhetorical support for improved human rights in the
world therefore it is acceptable to infer that Kennedy had that same weak focus on the
practical application of human rights in specific regards to apartheid South Africa.
Kennedy’s administration dealt with an array of issues surrounding South Africa.
Given the emerging role of the UN, the pressing need for uranium and gold, and a
demand by military experts to secure a stronghold in Africa the Kennedy White House,
similar to Eisenhower, failed to spur real change in the apartheid policy simply because it
was not a clear focus of the administration. It is easy to assume that Kennedy sought a
fair human rights situation in Pretoria but, similar to other Kennedy decisions, the public
image of the White House was more important than substantive actions.
The South African problem grew even more difficult in the wake of Sharpeville
in the international institution of peace. As the Afro-Asian bloc began to draft resolutions
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rebuking Pretoria, Kennedy’s team continued to cite that international sanctions could not
be placed on a state that did not pose an international threat.85 Thus continuing respect for
the UN founding principle of sovereignty throughout the Cold War. The May 1963
creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) created worries in the UN US
Mission. G. Mennen “Soapy” Williams, as Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, was the first one of Kennedy’s best and brightest to see that the Addis Ababa
conference would complicate US-UN relationships regarding South Africa by moving it
to a Chapter VII discussion: actions with respect to threats to the peace.86 In that instance,
the OAU entered the General Assembly in July 1963 ready to dismantle apartheid on the
international stage and disregarded Western traditions of appeasing South Africa through
trade.
Two components to US-South African relations were already previously
discussed during the Eisenhower administration: military and minerals. In the aftermath
of Sharpeville, Kennedy’s administration would attempt to minimize trade relations with
the apartheid government due to the pressure from African states. Kennedy’s State
Department and National Security Council explored the possibility of canceling the
uranium and other mineral trade agreements. The Executive Office of the President
argued for a gradual decrease in mineral procurement to be leveled in 1970.87 Others
were concerned that cancellations would lead the South Africans to trade uranium to the
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Soviets or Chinese.88 Soapy was worried a continued economic partnership with South
Africa would invite retaliation against the US.89 Such debate continued through
September 1963 but Kennedy continued the uranium trade with Pretoria to ensure a
Western alliance and a continual supply for the nuclear weapons.90 This facet of USSouth African relations during Kennedy’s tenure proved not surprising during the Cold
War. Kennedy justified that buying from the capitalist stronghold in Africa was better
than that stronghold selling to the Soviet enemy, despite the fact the Partial Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty was signed a month prior.91
In the wake of African decolonialism, Kennedy frequently struggled to take the
neutral middle road between the African nationalists and the white colonial powers.
Encompassing the hurdles of the Kennedy administration, further insight into Kennedy’s
stance comes from a phone conversation in July 1963 with George Ball, his
Undersecretary of State at the time. Kennedy was preparing for his phone call with Julius
Nyerere, eventual Tanzanian President and founding member of OAU, when he remarked
to Ball that he will appease Nyerere. The topic of the conversation was siding with the
Afro-Asian bloc on UN sanctions and limiting uranium purchases and other trading with
apartheid, to which Kennedy stated he would tell Nyerere he’s considering it in order to
curry favor with the African nationalist.92 Like Eisenhower, the struggles to preserve an
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economic and military relationship with apartheid was fraught with backlash from
oppositional forces. However, in Kennedy’s frequent attempts to establish amicable
relations with new African states, he often appeared more hypocritical than trustworthy.
This regular obstacle is seen further in Kennedy’s official position towards South
African resistance groups. Department of State Executive Secretary William Brubeck
wrote to Kennedy’s National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy that while the US has
done nothing to support the communist-dominated ANC, they have also not given aid to
the anti-Communist force of the PAC.93 This anti-Communist stance of the PAC is likely
from the State Department special report in which pages are dedicated to the Communist
influence over the ANC while the PAC favored a more African-based consensus
regarding organization despite its weaker positioning on the international stage.94 This
carefully calculated support for the comparably weaker political party is further informed
by Kennedy’s need to safeguard his image as a man of peace while trading with the
apartheid regime.
Soapy focused on preserving a positive Kennedy image in Africa relations while
the tense race relations in the US continued. In a telegram to the President, on the eve of
the controversial Export-Import Bank loan of $9.8 million to Pretoria, Soapy warned of
the potential fallout if Kennedy approved of the loan. Soapy claimed it would engender a
race war that was far more complex and dangerous than the East-West divide they were
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experiencing with the Soviet Union.95 By attempting to shift US foreign priorities, Soapy
explains the apartheid policy in Cold War terms. This was telegram came soon after the
infamous 16th Street Baptist Church bombing where the white supremacist Ku Klux Klan
murdered four black schoolgirls. Soapy included in the telegram that approving the loan
would prove, “particularly unfortunate” given recent domestic politics.96 This telegram
epitomizes Kennedy’s relationship with apartheid. Kennedy was essentially stuck
safeguarding US economic and geopolitical interests versus criticizing apartheid policies.
How could Kennedy give $9.8 million dollars to a white minority ruled state mere days
after a white supremacist group bombed a black church in Alabama? Quite simply he
could on the premise of protecting America’s national security. A similar issue with the
Export-Import Bank would arise in Jimmy Carter’s presidency, as discussed in the
literature review chapter.
For such a horrific event, Sharpeville did not make substantive changes to US
policies despite the efforts of pressure groups in the UN and domestically. Both
Eisenhower and Kennedy worked within the scope of the Cold War and by Cold War
standards, 69 Black South Africans were marginal compared to the military advantages
of a white-ruled African ally. Throughout the late 1960’s and into the 1970’s, the AfroAsian bloc continued to challenge the UN and dwindle by US stance on state sovereignty
or the veto power. Sixteen years after Sharpeville came new US leadership, shifting
power in the UN, and a sound apartheid resistance force that was faced with yet another
catalyst in apartheid rule: the Soweto Uprising on 1976.
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Chapter 3: “The powder keg” in June 1976
The South Western Township, Soweto, in 1976 was an overcrowded, under
resourced township which was not a unique story for the South African townships that
surrounded Johannesburg. One difference between Sharpeville, peaceful and small in
comparison to Soweto township, and Soweto was the township’s perception to white
South Africans. Though Sharpeville was the model township, Soweto did not hold such
accolade.97 Soweto was known for its urban population that travelled into Johannesburg
for work, high crime rates, and overwhelming youth population.98 Furthermore, the
apartheid state, while flourishing in the high apartheid period as black opposition went
underground and apartheid was unchallenged, continued to encroach on life in these
townships when the government reformed local administrative offices that took further
control away from black South Africans and diminished their ability to self-govern.
The Soweto Uprising represents a split in the narrative, as discussed in Chapter 1.
The current ANC narrative perpetuates the hegemony of the ANC, even in exile, they
directed the youth protests, further claiming the “Party that Ended Apartheid,” identity.99
Interestingly enough, while the narrative of Sharpeville was changed by the apartheid
government, Soweto continues to be a pinnacle of the ANC’s identity as the antiapartheid party. Control of the narrative or the memory of Soweto, however, is not the
focus of this paper though it is critical to understanding the documents of the domestic
reaction to Soweto.
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From its inception, Soweto’s student-led protest had an entirely different
organization style and method than Sharpeville. According to Julian Brown, the Soweto
Uprisings were sophisticated and, perhaps most surprisingly, grassroot organized. This
in-depth organizational structure is credited to the Black Consciousness Movement
(BCM) of early 1970’s and its creator, Steve Biko. Steve Biko’s theory of Black
Consciousness swept through the South African youth population, from grade school to
university level, and is what made the Soweto Uprising and its subsequent protests
possible. Essential to Black Consciousness was the belief that to end the oppression of
apartheid, blacks had to shed the internal feeling of inferiority.100
Echoing Biko’s sentiments that black inferiority is felt shared with South Africa’s
Indian and Colored populations, Oliver Tambo claimed Black Consciousness reflected,
“the consciousness of the rights of man.”101 The youth of South Africa were receptive to
Black Consciousness as multiple student organizations arose from Biko’s theory of
equality.102 The South African Student Organization (SASO), as one of the central
student groups, was central to energizing Soweto youth. As an organization that
countered the multiracial demographic of the National Union of South African Students
(NUSAS), SASO strengthened black identity through publications that celebrated
blackness.103 SASO was, in retrospect, was essential to the development of the Soweto
Students’ Representative Council (SSRC) as it became the central organization around
BCM. Ironically, SASO garnered national attention because the apartheid government
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elevated its platform through the courts. In the May 1975 case where thirteen SASO
members, known as the Pretoria Thirteen. were arrested under the Terrorism Act of 1967,
for organizing a celebration of Mozambique independence.104 Similar to the Defiance
Campaign’s influence over the 1960 passbook protests, this attention that SASO garnered
from the courts would inform the works of the SSRC in organizing against the Bantu
education reforms.
The Afrikaans Medium Decree of 1974 prompted immediate backlash by
students, parents, and educators. Changes to the education system in the townships came
from the Minister of Bantu Education, Michiel Botha. The language medium changed
from English to Afrikaans, otherwise known as the language of the oppressor. This
language change deliberately disadvantaged black schoolchildren as English was, despite
all efforts by the apartheid government to elevate the Afrikaans language, the main
language of South African business and, “essential for any youth who wanted to find a
place inside the economy.”105 These early student protests and walk outs were frequent
but inconsequential compared to what would occur June 16, 1976.
On that June morning, nearly fifteen hundred schoolchildren gathered at 7:30
AM, after hasty organization on June 13 when Tebello Motapanyane assembled the
Action Committee within SSRC, with plans to march from Orlando West Junior
Secondary School, one of three secondary schools in Soweto, to the Orlando Stadium.106
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Motapanyane, in an interview nearly six months later, asserted that the youth of South
Africa believed in “positive action,” like the armed struggle of Umkhonto weSizwe and
attacking police even if they did not have arms.107 As more students in nearby schools
were told of their assigned walk out schedule by the Action Committee, the crowds grew
as police surrounded children holding signs that read, “Down with Afrikaans,” or
“Afrikaans is oppressors language.”108 Reports of violent contact between police and
students were not reported until 10 AM where exiled anti-apartheid activist Baruch
Hirson reports students took to damaging property and storefronts in the area.109
Specifically outside Orlando West Secondary school, conflicts began around
10:30 AM when a policeman threw a tear gas cannister to a group of students singing
‘Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrica,’ a notable anti-apartheid freedom song, while another fired on
them thus ensuing panic in the crowd, as reported by Sophie Tema from The World
newspaper.110 This violence continued in the township for several days, where blacks
were seen fleeing into official buildings, burning them, and attacking police while the
police and reinforced paramilitary contingents came into the township with the same
armored cars used in Sharpeville to root out the violence.111 The official number of dead
protestors was 176, while the number of causalities were well over 500 as reported by the
apartheid government.112
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Taking control of narrative in Soweto was made more difficult by the very fact
that gaining control over the township would not be easy for apartheid officials as riots
continued in the weeks succeeding June 16. For Motapanyane, in recalling the events, he
remained steadfast that the motive for protest was the change of language of instruction
to Afrikaans, describing it as the spark to the powder keg, already poised to explode.113 In
the days that followed, worldwide reports of riots drew attention to the structural damage
by Soweto youth and the apartheid government attempt to exert totalitarian control over
the township through border control, presence of military grade equipment, and
checkpoints.114
3.2 “The Black Man knows his place:” The Apartheid Response to Soweto
While the national radio broadcast at 9 pm on June 16 said Soweto was “under
complete control,” the apartheid police continued to monitor the Soweto youth in the
months after June 16.115 Furthermore, Prime Minister Vorster made sure to immediately
call attention to culprits as black students who are, “destroying their own amenities,”
while “law and order are more important,” to Vorster than anything else.116 As the rioting
continued and organizations continued the calls for the end of oppressive policies in the
coming months, apartheid’s attempt to regain control of Soweto proved difficult. The first
case of apartheid’s attempt came with the ban of mass funerals of the Soweto victims
organized by the Black Parents Association. For the grieving families, the Minister of
Police’s refusal to allow public funeral services for the victims of the Uprisings was a
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way to hide apartheid responsibility for the children’s murders. Instead of following these
bans, Soweto youth held demonstrations at the internment sites of fallen youths and often
times, altercations arose between youth and police while families and friends chanted
phrases such as, “We shall overcome,” and police fired shots.117 The processing of grief
could not be silenced, and neither could the demands for equality.
Similar to Sharpeville, the need to seize control of the narrative came from the
commissioned report to detail the events of Soweto that was released on July 2. The
Commission of Inquiry into the Riots of Soweto and Other Places in the Republic of
South Africa During June 1976 report was the central apartheid response to the Uprising
and done solely to justify the government’s treatment of black South Africans.118
Comprised of 69 volumes of reporting, the Cillie Commission did everything it could to
shift blame from the Soweto police forces to the rioting youths. In the compiling of
evidence, Cillie often cites the unwillingness of witnesses to come forth with information
on recent arrests for fear of victimization, though stands by the government’s official
policy of releasing prisoners in a timely manner.119 This official policy held the release of
prisoners not convicted but, as acknowledged by Internal Security Act No. 79, this policy
quickly turned into a tool of monitoring the voices of activists by imprisoning them with
no foreseeable release date.120 While altercations continued during the following months,
the police deterred people willing to come forward to the Commission. This deliberate
police deterrence, however, was not ever highlighted in the state report.
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The Commission further detailed a central figure in the Soweto Uprising, Hector
Pieterson. Pieterson was a twelve-year-old boy who joined in the protests with his friends
and sister. The photograph of a boy carrying Pieterson’s lifeless body almost immediately
became a worldwide symbol of the brutality of apartheid. The Cillie Commission
responded to news stations’ claims that Pieterson’s death was a cold blood murder by
stating that Pieterson was a victim of a stray bullet, not intended for him.121 All of this,
despite the fact that Pieterson was shot in the back and after the photograph circulated,
the young man depicted as carrying Pieterson had flee South Africa to avoid police
questioning.122
Like the reaction to Sharpeville, the apartheid government sought complete
control over Soweto, however, Soweto would never fully be returned to full apartheid
control. As key figures were chased into exiled, the Minister of Justice, Jimmy Kruger,
used government censorship and overreach to further disband anti-apartheid groups that
participated in the Uprising and shut down The World, a black controlled magazine in the
Republic in 1977.123 While the Cillie report concluded the Uprising was not the result of
an oppressive government, the imprisonment and eventual murder of Steve Biko
reminded anti-apartheid activists of this incredulously false statement.124
3.3 The Problem with Allies: The US Response to Soweto
President Gerald Ford’s handling of the Soweto Uprising was complicated not
only by his altogether weak foreign policy practices in the age of emerging statehoods
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and rise in Middle East conflicts but further by his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger’s,
relationship with apartheid leaders. To briefly overview the US-South African relations
prior to the Uprising, Ford had high hopes of Kissinger working with Prime Minister
Vorster via ambassador Botha to normalize the situation in Angola as Cubans were being
sent to fight alongside rebel fighters.125 The ever popular domino theory was further
applied in the Angola crisis for fears that if Cubans were able to seize control of Angola,
they could easily take Namibia which was still occupied by South African forces.126 This
close reliance on South Africa as an ally is worth of further analysis because it explains
the US’ lackluster response to the Uprising.
The US role in Southern Africa was best epitomized by Kissinger’s conversations
with apartheid leadership. In June, Kissinger and Vorster discussed how to use South
African infrastructure to limit the capabilities of Rhodesian resistance fighters and
monitor the outcome of Rhodesian leadership changes while maintaining South African
hegemony.127 The South African structural sabotage practices ranged from deliberate
corruption within Mozambique private railways and severing telecommunications lines
within Botswana, all done to disadvantage exiled anti-apartheid leaders in neighboring
states.128 Vorster justified his administration’s actions by saying, “That’s Africa,” to
mean anything goes when your state has the superior resources and maintains regional
hegemony.129 It’s clear that Kissinger and, by proxy, Ford had no intentions of severing
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ties with their South African ally, even after another state-sponsored massacre. This
propping up of a friendly state in Southern Africa is even further highlighted by
Kissinger’s May conversation with Botha stating, “we are not trying to reform you…”
but rather, “history is against you, but we want to buy some time at least.”130 While
Ford’s administration acknowledged the continued rise of African statehood, they
willingly sustained an archaic system of oppression by supporting South Africa. Ford’s
excuse for maintaining relations is best described in his conversation with Kissinger the
day of June 16 with, “what we are trying to do is overcome things like this,” this being a
direct response to Kissinger’s explanation of the Soweto Uprising as apartheid officials
managing to kill more rioters.131
Upon the news of the Uprising, the US Mission to the UN took a counter
approach by conforming to UN consensus to condemn South Africa through the US
ambassador Albert Sherer, Jr. In the June 19 statement, Sherer called for harmony in
South Africa in a Security Council resolution condemning the apartheid actions in
Soweto while making an importance distinction that such condemnation does not mean
the endorsement of Article VII of the UN Charter action, the use of military force to
maintain peace within a state by the Security Council.132 While promoting peace in the
UN, the US continued the advantageous relationship with apartheid under the Ford
administration, just as it had under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy.
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Moving beyond the analysis given in the Literature Review, President Jimmy
Carter’s presidency posed unique rhetoric stance on apartheid similar to President
Kennedy. In an early 1977 interview with publishers and broadcasters, Carter claimed to
have an evolving policy in transitioning South Africa to majority rule.133 Carter
surrounded himself with human rights activists in his cabinet leadership, which helped
further signal to apartheid officials that the former Governor of Georgia was willing to
take substantive steps towards racial progress. Andrew Young, US ambassador to the
UN, criticized the African-bloc demands to repeal South African membership as a
“propaganda weapon,” that would not foster social change in Pretoria.134 Young’s
verbose call for UN action while offering realistic solutions in private business
encouragement to challenge apartheid was not unique to the rest of Carter’s
administration.
Vice President Walter Mondale, similar to Henry Kissinger under President Ford,
was the key in communicating Carter’s push for peace to Vorster while still maintaining
stable transitions in Rhodesia and ending occupation in Namibia. In a May 1977 meeting,
Mondale reminded Vorster of the US’ own struggle with equality which informed the
Carter belief that full and successful democracy is only possible with full participation.135
Mondale and Vorster further debate this American notion of equality while struggling to
encompass South African cultural diversity to which Pretoria leadership articulates the
idea that they, the Afrikaners, had vastly improved economic opportunities for Indians
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and Blacks in South Africa compared to the previous British controlled regime.136
Mondale proposed several policy plans regarding South Africa each with a focus on
international cooperation through the UN. Mondale utilized the international organization
to maintain frank US hegemony over Southern Africa by ensuring a strong US stance
against apartheid while placating the apartheid ally during the regime turmoil in
Rhodesia.137
This duality in the relationship was obvious early in the Carter administration
when cabinet members discussed how to handle Rhodesia and concurrently advocate for
human rights shifts in Pretoria. In countering Kissinger’s more permitting attitude with
Vorster, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski called for an end of illusion
building policy and more overt demands for change.138 This shift came when discussing
potentially breaking from European allies on UN resolutions on South African sanctions
arose in pair with growing African bloc demands.139 These demands ranged from full
mandatory embargoes advocacy to pursue a new international economic order.140 The
truth of the Rhodesia matter came when it proved hypocritical of a human rights
espousing Carter administration was urged majority rule in Rhodesia while working with
the apartheid regime as noted by UN Ambassador Donald McHenry.141 This
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interconnected problem of UN recourse for change were externalized in tense
conversations between Carter officials and Pretoria leaders.
Brzezinski reminded Botha, while discussing the role of the US in Rhodesia, that
the demands for majority rule by black South Africans were legitimate and the growing
need change social conditions in South Africa meant the US had to sustain the
fundamental stance of Carter’s administration.142 This staunch perspective in Carter’s
cabinet, however, would hinder any serious US-led change inside South Africa. Though
not the immediate focus of this chapter, it is important to regard the shortcomings of
Carter’s promising administration post-Soweto. Further echoing Alex Thomson’s work
explored in Chapter One, Carter’s demands transformed into a stalemate in diplomacy.
This stalemate was foreshadowed immediately in the early days of the administration
when, in that same January conversation with Brzezinski, Botha stated, “In South Africa
we have never shared power.”143
The Soweto Uprising was a missed opportunity for the Ford administration and
the further hinderance of diplomacy of Carter. Ford was intent on allowing open
discussion between Kissinger and apartheid and Carter’s hard rhetoric would proactive a
cold shoulder from Pretoria when asked to change its ways. While the apartheid
government continued to ignore the demands for revisions, it would not be Ford or
Kissinger that lead with rhetoric for change. That was seen clearly when Kissinger
explained the Uprising as a moment when rioters were killed again by apartheid police
rather than noting the overwhelming number of schoolchildren amongst the dead. Carter,
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however, proved no better when unable to converse with South Africa without making
them defensive of their apartheid policy as a way to maintain power in their state. These
two extremes did not mirror the US reaction to Sharpeville exactly as Kennedy’s rhetoric
paled in comparison to Carter’s and Eisenhower’s conflictual cabinet lacked the
messaging tactics that Kissinger had monopolized. Nonetheless, while the US appeared
stronger in the UN, with progressive ambassadors like Young and McHenry in
supporting the anti-apartheid forces, Carter’s regime did not bring the end of apartheid
nor the further empowerment of local anti-apartheid groups. Change in South Africa
would come not from the official channels of US diplomacy, even into the 1980’s with
more conservative policies of subtle economic appeasement like Reagan’s constructive
engagement.
Chapter 4: Living in “a World of Extraordinary Change:” Conclusions
Apartheid as a concept, practice, and government juxtaposed the US position
during the Cold War as an enemy of the USSR and an ally of a human rights oppressive
state. The Sharpeville Massacre of March 21, 1960 demonstrated an inconsistency in US
foreign policy within the Eisenhower administration while President Kennedy’s half
promises failed to reconcile Cold War practices with human rights rhetoric. South Africa,
with its vital minerals to US nuclear proliferation and economic advantages, was never
truly criticized under President Eisenhower even as the US civil rights movement was
beginning to gain international attention. Kennedy’s inability to generate holistic
sanctions against apartheid meant that the Cold War alliance was maintained while
appearing progressive.

In maintaining the Cold War relationship, the years after Sharpeville gave rise to
further state oppression in South Africa which reached another fever pitch in 1976 with
the Soweto Uprising. Countering Eisenhower with a clear consensus of governance led
by President Ford and Henry Kissinger, the US remained a public supporter of strong
allies in tumultuous negotiation and subtle criticizer of apartheid. President Carter,
though weak in delivery, vastly outweighed Kennedy’s rhetoric through direct challenges
in the UN and in official meetings with apartheid officials.
Soweto posed the international world with the question of whether black students
were unquailed rioters and if so, were apartheid local and national officials justified in the
state of emergency implementation attempts to seize control over the townships. While
Sharpeville involved mostly working-class adults, the primary victims in Soweto
presented a critical injunction for the US as apartheid officials could not hide behind the
bullet ridden bodies of schoolchildren. Kissinger ensured a temporary appeasement of the
international community through his continued meeting with Botha and Vorster with
detailed talks on the optics of these meetings. President Carter and his officials were in
stark contrast in President Ford. While Kissinger alluded to the eventual decline of
apartheid with Vorster, Brzezinski told Botha to accept the, “world of extraordinary
change,” where apartheid-US relations were no longer possible, even while South Africa
was playing a key role in regional negotiations.144 The chance at this change was not
achieved under Carter.
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While the discussion of the fall of apartheid is not central to this paper, it is
important to note the moments where the decline could have started. In the case of March
21, 1960 and June 16, 1976, both Sharpeville and Soweto had the potential to
unequivocally challenge apartheid as a form of governance and promote governmental
reform. But neither happened. Instead, the precipitation of oppression through wide
sweeping criminal acts, further inclusion of Cold War alliances, and stifling of the
African bloc in international organizations ensured that a system of oppression, that the
US denounced, would thrive.
The apartheid was able to hide its acts of genocide through international
legitimization and US backing. In the age of the Cold War, the enemy was never the
capitalist friend in Pretoria but the Soviet Union and as such, apartheid was able to
masquerade, to borrow from Oliver Tambo’s phrasing in the beginning, its human rights
abuses as a sovereign state. This does not necessarily mean that the Sharpeville Massacre
and the Soweto Uprising were simply tragic events. Rather each served as US foreign
policy reflection points that exposed inconsistencies, superfluous rhetoric, and corrupt,
albeit advantageous, partnerships to the US and international public to debate and push
towards more progressive changes that would succeed Cold War politics.

Bibliography
Primary Sources
Action Youth. “Sharpeville Day.” Arise Vukani 2, no. 3: 1987. Digital Innovation South
Africa.

Associated Press. “50 killed in South Africa as Police Fire on Rioters.” The New York
Times, March 22, 1960.
Associated Press. “South Africa Replies.” The New York Times, March 26, 1960.
Associated Press. “South African Premier is Wounded by White Assassin at Fair in
Johannesburg.” The New York Times, April 13, 1960.
Associated Press, “Text of Vorster Statement,” The New York Times, June 19, 1976.
Burns, John F. “South Africa Toll Rises to 58 Dead; Nearly 800 Hurt.” The New York
Times, June 18, 1976.
Burns, John F. “6 Die in South Africa Riot After Black Student Protest.” The New York
Times, June 17, 1976.
Biko, Steve. “Black Consciousness and the Quest for a True Humanity.” Humanity 4, no.
1: 1972. Digital Innovation South Africa.
Biko, Steve. “I Write What I Like: We Blacks,” SASO Newsletter, 1969. Digital
Innovation South Africa.
“Briefing Paper for Senator Kennedy, by Professor Fred Burke.” Papers of Papers of
John F. Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers. Presidential Campaign Files, 1960.
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
Carter, Jimmy. “Interview with the President Question-and-Answer Session with a Group
of Publishers, Editors, and Broadcasters.” April 15, 1977, The American
Presidency Project
“Comments upon the NBC staff memo of July 25 re South African uranium.” William
Brubeck Personal Files, Box 387 A, South Africa Uranium. John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library.

Director of Central Intelligence Agency. Special Intelligence Estimate: Short-Term
Prospects for South Africa. Central Intelligence Agency. July 19, 1960.
Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa. “The Pretoria Thirteen,” May 1975, Digital
Innovation South Africa.
http://africanactivist.msu.edu/document_metadata.php?objectid=32-130-1C11
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, Africa. (Washington:
Government Printing Office). Document 344.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, Africa. (Washington:
Government Printing Office). Document 345.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, Africa. (Washington:
Government Printing Office). Document 353.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, Africa. (Washington:
Government Printing Office). Document 347.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa.
(Washington: Government Printing Office). Document 261.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa.
(Washington: Government Printing Office). Document 264.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa.
(Washington: Government Printing Office). Document 265.
Government of the Union of South Africa, “Internal Security Act No. 79.” Apartheid
Legislation 1948-1990 Collection, O’Malley Archive.
Government of the Union of South Africa. “Suppression of Communism Act, 1951.”
Apartheid Legislation 1948-1990 Collection, O’Malley Archives.

Government of the Union of South Africa. “Unlawful Organizations Act No. 24.”
Apartheid Legislation 1948-1990 Collection, O’Malley Archives.
Government of the Union of South Africa. “Sabotage Act General Laws Amendment Act
No. 76.” Apartheid Legislation 1948-1990 Collection, O’Malley Archives.
Ingallsspecial, Leonard. “Republic is voted for South Africa; Verwoerd Victor; Record
All-White Poll Backs Move to End Allegiance to the British Crown.” The New
York Times, October 7, 1960
Horrell, Muriel. A Survey on Race Relations in South Africa. South Africa: South African
Institute of Race Relations, 1961. Digital Innovation South Africa.
Hovey, Graham. “Conflict in U.N. is Doubted by Young.” The New York Times, January
14, 1977.
“Memorandum for the President from Vice President Mondale, April 21, 1977.” Walter
F. Mondale Personal Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, Digital Collections.
“Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Botha, May 23, 1976.” National
Security Council Memorandum of Conversation Collection, Gerald Ford
Presidential Library, Digital Collections.
“Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Ford, June 17, 1976.” National
Security Council Memorandum of Conversation Collection, Gerald Ford
Presidential Library, Digital Collections.
“Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Vorster, June 23, 1976.” Box 20,
Memorandums of Conversation, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Digital
Collections.

“Memorandum of Conversation, Third Meeting between Vice President Mondale and
Prime Minister Vorster, May 20, 1977.” Walter F. Mondale Personal Papers,
Minnesota Historical Society, Digital Collections.
“Memo to Dean Rusk from G. Mennen Williams, US Policy Towards South Africa, June
1963.” William Brubeck Personal Files. Box 387, South Africa 3/63- 8/63. John
F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
“Memo to McGeorge Bundy from William Brubeck, October 29, 1963.” William
Brubeck Personal Files. Box 387 A, South Africa 9/63- 11/63. John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library.
“Memo to the President from G. Mennen Williams, n.d.” William Brubeck Personal
Files. Box 387 A, South Africa Uranium. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
“National Security Council Meeting Minutes, April 7, 1976.” Box 2, Gerald Ford
Presidential Library, Digital Collections.
“National Strategy Series: South Africa, October 28, 1963.” National Security Files.
Countries, South Africa, General, National Security Strategy Series “South
Africa” 10/28/63 Box 159A, National Strategy Series. John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library.
“Note from Myer Feldman to Dean Rusk, September 23, 1963.” William Brubeck
Personal Files. Box 387 A, South Africa Uranium. John F. Kennedy Presidential
Library.
Oliver Tambo interview with E.S. Reddy. March 1, 1977,
https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/interview-oliver-tambo-luanda-aftersummit-meeting-presidents-frontline-states-and-southern.

“Possible South African Reactions to Proposals to Cancel or Alter the US Uranium
Purchase Contract.” William Brubeck Personal Files. Box 387 A, South Africa
Uranium. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
Reeves, Ambrose. Commission of Enquiry into the Occurrences at Sharpeville (and other
places) on the 21st March, 1960. University of California Los Angeles,
International Digital Ephemera Project.
“Remarks of Senator John F Kennedy, March 26, 1960.” Papers of Papers of John F.
Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers. Presidential Campaign Files, 1960. John F.
Kennedy Presidential Library.
Republic of South Africa. “Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Riots at Soweto
and Elsewhere from the 16th of June 1976 to the 28th of February 1977.”
Northwestern University Libraries.
“Strategy at the 18th General Assembly, Sept 9, 1963.” William Brubeck Personal Files.
Box 387 A, South Africa 9/63-11/63. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
Tebello Motapanyane. “How June 16 demo was planned.” Interview by South African
Students Movement. Digital Imaging South Africa, January 1977.
“Telcon Record between the President and George Ball, July 16, 1963.” The Personal
Papers of George W. Ball. Box 7, South Africa 7/27/61-10/31/63. John F.
Kennedy Presidential Library.
Teltsch, Kathleen. “South Africa is Suspended by UN Assembly, 91-22.” The New York
Times, Nov 13, 1974.

“The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1933, 59-60, July 12, 1976.”
Department of State Bulletins Collections, Gerald Ford Presidential Library,
Digital Collections.
The New African Magazine. “Communism Come-back?” August 1962. Digital
Innovation South Africa.
Tom, Petrus. “Sharpeville: March 21, 1960.” Worker News no. 40 (1980). Federation of
South African Trade Unions.
“UN Policy for the Next Security Council Meeting on South Africa, October 1963.”
William Brubeck Personal Files. Box 387, Security Council 10/63-11/63. John F.
Kennedy Presidential Library.
Wessels, P. J. Report on the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the
Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (Namely, at Sharpeville Location and
Evaton), and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960,
April 13, 1960. Special Book Collection, University of South Africa Institutional
Repository.
Secondary Sources
Baldwin, Lewis V. Toward the Beloved Country: Martin Luther King, Jr. and South
Africa. Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1995.
Borstelmann, Thomas. The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in
the Global Arena. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Brown, Julian. The Road to Soweto: Resistance and the Uprising of 16 June 1976. USA:
Boydell & Brewer, 2016.

Cherry, Janet. Spear of the Nation (Umkhonto weSizewe): South Africa’s Liberation
Army: 1960’s-1990’s. USA: Ohio University Press, 2011.
Christenson, Ron. Political Trials in History: From Antiquity to the Present, 1st ed. USA:
Transaction Publishers, 1991.
Dubow, Saul. “Racial Irredentism, Ethnogenesis, and White Supremacy in HighApartheid South Africa.” Kronos 41 (2015): 236-264.
Fraser, Cary. “Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock: The Eisenhower Administration
and the Dilemma of Race for US Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 24, no. 4
(2000): 233-264.
Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. USA: Penguin Books, 2005.
Grant, Nicholas. Winning Our Freedom Together: African Americans and Apartheid,
1945-1960. USA: University of North Carolina Press, 2017.
Gurney, Christabel. “The 1970s: The Anti-Apartheid Movement’s Difficult Decade.”
Journal of Southern African Studies 35 (2009): 471-487.
Hirson, Baruch. Year of Fire, Year of Ash: The Soweto Revolt-Roots of a Revolutions?
London: Zed Books Ltd., 2016.
Hyman, Zoe. “’To have its cake and eat it too:’ US policy toward South Africa during the
Kennedy administration,” The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics and Culture
8, no. 2 (2015), 138-155.
Irwin, Ryan. Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Landau, Paul S. “The ANC, MK, and ‘The Turn to Violence’ (1960-1962),” South
African Journal of History 64, no. 3: 538-563.

Lodge, Tom. Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and its Consequences. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011.
Massie, Robert Kinloch. Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the
Apartheid Years. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1997.
Macqueen, Ian. “Students, Apartheid, and the Ecumenial Movement in South Africa,
1960-1975,” Journal of Southern African Studies 39, no. 2 (2013): 447-463.
Nesbitt, Francis Njubi. Race for Sanctions: African Americans Against Apartheid, 19461994. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.
Noer, Thomas J. Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in
Africa 1948-1968. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985.
Stevens, Simon. “Boycotts and Sanctions against South Africa: An International History,
1946-1970.” PhD diss., Columbia University, New York City, 2016. Columbia
University Academic Commons.
Thakur, Vineet. “Foreign Policy and its People: Transforming the Apartheid Department
of Foreign Affairs,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 26 (2015): 514-533.
Thomson, Alex. “The Diplomacy of Impasse: The Carter Administration and Apartheid
South Africa,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 21 (2010): 107-124.
Van Wyk, Martha S. “Ally or Critic? The United States’ Response to South African
Nuclear Development, 1949-1980,” Cold War History 7, no. 2 (2007): 195- 225.
Vinson, Robert Trent. “Albert Luthuli’s Private Struggle: How an Icon of Peace Came to
Accept Sabotage in South Africa,” Journal of African History 59, no. 1 (2018):
69-96

Welsh, David. The Rise and Fall of Apartheid. Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball Publishers,
Ltd, 2009.
White, George. Holding the Line: Race, Racism, and American Foreign Policy Towards
Africa, 1953-1961. USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005.

